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PETER J. LONGO* and ROBERT D. MIEWALD**

Institutions in Water Policy:
The Case of Nebraska
ABSTRACT
Experts in Nebraska water law suspect that the courts, because
of legislative inaction, are heavily involved in making basic decisions
about groundwater.It is true that there is a greatdeal of legislative
inaction, but our research indicates that the courts seldom decide
water-relatedcases and when they do, there is a tendency to defer
to the local administrative units. The bureaucracy makes the most
water policy, and the idea that there is excessive "judicialization"
of public policy may be exaggerated.

INTRODUCTION
American legislators, faced with insoluble problems and pressured by
deeply committed groups, have willingly forfeited and delegated their
lawmaking powers to courts and administrators.' In Meier's words, they
have "sublimated political issues into professional, technical, and administrative questions." 2 Rather than framing definitive statements of
policy,,there is a desire to make some vague effort so that legislators can
claim that any unfavorable outcomes (and today almost any action is
likely to strike some ferocious Political Action Committee as unfavorable)
will not come back to haunt them on election day. The American policy
process is increasingly expressed in the passive voice ("decisions were
made") instead of the active voice ("we made the decision").
Congress and state legislators are willing to complain about the "usurpation" of their powers by the judiciary or bureaucracy. At the same time

they proceed, as described by Lowi3 and others, to relinquish their policy-

making responsibilities. Water policy in the western states exemplifies
this abdication of legislative responsibility. With ever greater demands
on a basically stable resource, politicians prefer to avoid the hard questions
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kearney State College.
**Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. R. Shumavon & H. Hibbelin, Administrative Discretion and Public Policy Implementation 6

(1986).
2. K. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government
47 (1987).
3. T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2d ed. 1979).
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by playing a non-zero sum game with Mother Nature. No major water
user will be denied access to an adequate supply even if the demands
exceed the supply. Few lawmakers want to make drastic reallocations,
for example, from agriculture to urban uses, but reality must intrude into
these fantasies. As Ingram, Laney, and McCain concluded from their study
of the Four-Corners states, where the political costs of allocative decisions
are high, "legislatures are likely to make 'structural' decisions, that is
they are apt to delegate decisionmaking responsibilities to the groups
involved or to defer to some other decisionmaking process. Negotiated
agreements lessen the risks of offending important interests. Legislators
are often willing to ratify decisions made outside the legislature, for if
another level of government decides the issue, then that level can be
blamed." 4 Smith observed much the same behavior in a study of California, Arizona, and New Mexico.' He found that the players in the water
game are concerned with preserving access to loose legal structures. Smith
concluded that "groundwater users, as represented by interest groups
concerned with the matter fear, not centralizedadministrationof groundwater rights, but rather theform that administrationwill take." 6 Students
of the policy process in natural resources need to be better able to identify
the situs within which the post-legislative negotiations take place.
Nebraska provides an intriguing example for those wishing to learn
where and how water policy is actually made. In particular, the state's
precious groundwater supply has been managed only tangentially by authoritative policy statements by the legislature. The courts are seen by
most observers as the primary recipients of power over the resource. In
the most comprehensive treatise on Nebraska water law, the authors
concluded that the state suffers not from any physical shortages but instead
from a "legislative and judicial framework that prevents effective utilization and management." 7
In 1973, professors from the University of Nebraska College of Law
predicted a breakdown in the jerry-built system of management: "It is
generally recognized that neither local management nor a workable longterm state water plan can be evolved by the process of private litigation
which offers only a narrow perspective on problems throughout an area.
Courts can only react to cases before them, and future guidelines must
come from legislative leadership. "' Even after the legislature made a stab
4. Ingram, Laney & McCain, Managing a Limited Resource: The Political Constraints on Water
Policy in the Four Corner States, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 719, 743 (1979).
5. Smith, Centralized Decisionmaking in the Administration of Groundwater Rights: The Experience of Arizona, California and New Mexico and Suggestions for the Future, 24 Nat. Res. J.641
(1984).
6. td. at 688 (emphasis added).
7. R. Hamsberger & N. Thorson, Nebraska Water Law and Administration 1 (1984).
8. Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fisher, Groundwater: From Windmills to Comprehensive Public Management, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 179, 240 (1973).
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at groundwater management in 1975, there was speculation that the law
had only created the framework for further litigation. 9 By 1984, a general
survey of state water policy suggested that "in the absence of legislative
action on groundwater, users have resorted to informal agreements, contracts and lawsuits. Consequently, the courts, according to some, have
become the major water policymaking body in regards to the state's
underground water supplies.""0
In the absence of legislative action, then, it is presumed that the courts
have become the major determinants of water policy. When that presumption is nourished enough, one can then go on to speak portentously
of the "judicialization of water policy." The next step is to draw conclusions about the current state of democratic government in the United
States, when in fact, the causal connection between legislative inaction
and judicial activity is weak, since obviously lawmakers do not tell the
courts directly, "We can't do it, so you judges take over." Any avoidance
of power by the legislature is not a direct transfer to the judiciary. The
courts may indeed become involved eventually, but there is likely to be
a more immediate recipient.
The Nebraska case can help us to uncover the intermediaries who, in
reality, may be far more than a conduit to the courtroom, and the courts
may be far less important than has been supposed. The Nebraska legislature, as Ingram and Smith predicted, has become more involved with
the construction of a constitution of water policy than with the resolution
of substantive decisions. With the realization that the groundwater supply
is not inexhaustible, policymakers have been forced to grapple with the
need for some sort of allocative mechanisms. An awareness of limitations,
however, was not associated with a desire on the part of any major actors
to relinquish their "fair share" of water.
While an omniscient master planner might be able to come up with a
perfect system of allocation, the legislature is filled with ordinary mortals
whose major concern has been the high political costs in being connected
to any definitive statement about who will get what. Further analysis of
the problem as a never-ending process is to be preferred to a bold announcement of winners and losers. The non-partisan legislature has never
been noted for strong leadership, a deficiency all the more pronounced
since no Nebraska governor has ever given the development of water
policy a high priority. So when the issue can no longer be ignored, the
furniture of government must be rearranged so that the real policymakers
become more obscure. The legislature has provided an aura of legitimacy
to its avoidance of controversy by creating or enhancing two institutions,
9. Klein, Groundwater Management in Nebraska Without a Legislative Solution: Is There an
Alternative? 57 Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1978).
10. J. Aucoin, Water in Nebraska: Use, Politics, Policies 64 (1984).
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one a state agency and the other at the local level. Together, these institutions seem to provide both scientific certainty and grass-roots democracy
in the making of water policy.
THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
For many years, the Nebraska Department of Water Resources (DWR),
headed by a director, was primarily a bookkeeping operation for the
management of the claims for water rights filed under the state's system
of prior appropriation. Its basic function was largely the ministerial one
of recording claims and insuring that senior appropriators had an adequate
supply of water for surface irrigation." Later laws also gave to the department the responsibility for recording the registration of wells, but
there was no provision for the denial of permission to drill.
As the state faced a new set of pressures on water resources in the
1970s, especially on groundwater, greater discretion was given, albeit in
piecemeal fashion, to the director of DWR. As discussed below, the
director was given a role in the management of critical groundwater
problems, although the degree of involvement is somewhat uncertain. In
another area, after a court decision reopened the controversial question
of interbasin water transfers within the state in 1980, the legislature gave
the director the authority to approve such transfers after taking into consideration several enumerated factors.'"
The result of these legislative moves has been the transformation of a
number of political issues into technical questions. Instead of elected
officials clearly stating their policy preferences, the science of hydrology
is called upon to settle a variety of significant questions. The latest step
in the "scientizing" of politics was in 1987 with the Nebraska Supreme
Court decision in In reApplication U-2. " In 1983, the legislature passed
an act to deal with the complex question of the incidental recharge of
underground water reservoirs. The law provided in part:
Any person having an approved perfected appropriation may file with
the department an application for recognition of incidental underground water storage associated with such appropriation on a form
prescribed and furnished by the department without cost. Upon receipt of an application, the department shall proceed in accordance
with rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by the department. '"
In 1984, the Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District,
which manages a large irrigation system in western Nebraska, applied
for. recognition of the incidental storage of water beneath 684,000 acres.
I1. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-209 (1984).
12. Id.
13. 226 Neb. 594, 413 N.W. 2d 290 (1987).
14. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-226.01 (Supp. 1986).
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The district maintained that the aquifers within this area had been recharged by seepage from its extensive system of irrigation canals. The
director approved the application.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in In re Application U-2 rejected the
protest of landowners in the area and accepted the department's reasoning
that the district's facilities were largely responsible for the creation of an
"underground water mound." The court reasoned that "[tihe proper standard of review for this court to follow in cases involving appeals from
the DWR . . .is to search only for errors appearing in the record; i.e.,
to determine if the judgment conforms to the law, if it is supported by
competent and relevant evidence, and if the DWR action is neither arbitrary or capricious nor unreasonable. . . ."'5
The opinion was based primarily on the testimony of hydrologists about
the increase in the water table within the area in a 50-year period. The
court admitted that "the problem facing the director of DWR in determining this issue is the fact that this underground water storage is not
held in neatly confined reservoirs or bins, but is available as nature
presents the situations to humans trying to avail themselves of something
furnished by nature-the underground strata making water storage possible. "6
In order to solve the problem of ownership of stored water, the court
agreed with the department's conclusion that owners of overlying land
must respect the control of the water by the district. This indicates that
the next step in refinement of this legal development would be the sale
of the water by the district to buyers, whether or not those buyers are
owners of the land over the water, but how can we tell the difference
between the stored water and the water naturally occurring under a user's
land? The court said "[t]he calculation of the amount of that water is
now more difficult, but clearly can be made."' 7 The immediate editorial
response to this sense of great confidence was "We'll see!"' 8
Much of the court's faith in the director of DWR was a reflection of
the gestures made by the legislature that science would be served. In
referring to the department's jurisdiction "over all matters pertaining to
water rights of irrigation, power and other useful purposes," the court
said, in effect, that the problem had been solved by fiat: "The Legislature
has recognized the expertise and experience needed to determine the
difficult question presented in the overall water situation in this state when
it required that the director of DWR be a professional engineer with at
least 5 years' experience in a position of responsibility in irrigation work."' 9
15. In re Application U-2, 226 Neb. at 599, 413 N.W. 2d at 295.
16. Id. at 601, 413 N.W, 2d at 296.
17. Id. at 606, 413 N.W. 2d at 299.
18. Lincoln Sunday Journal-Star, Oct. 4, 1987, at F2, col. 1.
19. In re Application U-2, 226 Neb at 608, 413 N.W. 2d at 300 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. §46701 (1984)).
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Under the guise of "expertise and experience," the legislature has
abetted the rapid accretion of power by the director of DWR. This growth
in authority, however, has apparently not been the result of any definitive
plan. No one would dare suggest that policy had been handed to a "water
czar." Instead, legislators have preferred, in several instances, to translate
the political problems into scientific ones. Insofar as the courts have
played a role, it has been to acquiesce in this transfer, so they have not
seriously challenged the legislative maneuvers. The courts have not been
making the policy but instead have ratified the new water constitution
premised on technical expertise.
NATURAL RESOURCES DISTRICTS
The second major repository of legislative power in the field of water
policy has been the Natural Resources District (NRD). In this instance,
however, the guiding principle has been local democracy rather than
technical competence. The courts have been willing allies of the legislature in recognizing this aspect of state water management. In 1969,
after several years of study and negotiations, the legislature passed the
Natural Resources District Act.2' This act consolidated more than 150
water-related special districts, the most important of which was the soil
conservation district. After the consolidation went into effect in 1972,
twenty-four multipurpose districts, based on hydrologic lines, covered
the entire state. The legislature soon learned that the NRDs were a convenient place to locate some of the more troublesome political problems
associated with groundwater management.
The Natural Resources Districts are governed by locally elected boards
of directors. Funding for the NRDs is derived primarily from a local
property tax. The districts have broad powers to manage water resources:
erosion prevention, soil conservation, flood control, sanitary drainage,
water supply development, pollution control, fish and wildlife hatitat,
forestry and range management, development of recreational facilities,
and, most importantly, the management of the quality and quantity of
groundwater. Most districts have a professional staff headed by a fulltime manager.
The act, together with its amendments, seems to offer a good deal of
potential for effective water management. Additionally, the act embraces
several elements of democratic participation, and conceivably, the contending water users might profitably shift their attention from the legislature to the NRDs. As successors to the soil conservation districts, the
NRDs have retained much of their rural flavor and the boards have been
20. Codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. §2-3201-3261.
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dominated by rural water users. In the districts around the metropolitan
areas of Omaha and Lincoln, the provisions for the nomination and election of board members made it almost impossible for urban interests to
elect any more than a bare majority of the directors. As an instrument
for groundwater management, the NRD was destined to preserve the
status quo while giving the appearance of movement toward the solution
of pressing water problems.
The NRD legislation did not provide adequate funding to completely
address the needs of a comprehensive water plan. Harnsberger et al.
observe that "the legislature by repealing the authorization in the original
bill for general obligation bonds, has severely limited the ability of a
district to raise funds for a large project."'" The 1987 session of the
legislature did finally authorize an increase in the property tax, after
overriding a gubernatorial veto. It is not anticipated, however, that the
additional funding will be enough for any major initiatives by the districts.
Whether or not the NRDs were effectively designed for the solution of
water problems, they certainly created great potential for litigation. If the
judicialization thesis is correct, then the NRDs should have stimulated a
large number of lawsuits, leading eventually to the determination of water
policy by the courts. The possibility for court involvement in the 1970s
increased as attention was directed toward what appeared to be an emerging crisis in the area of groundwater regulation.
The foundation for confusion and the litigation had been laid by the
Groundwater Preference Act of 1957.22 A priority system for the distribution of surface water had been established by the state constitution.
The 1957 act was a legislative attempt at determining groundwater priorities. The statute gives preference in the use of groundwater to those
using it for domestic purposes.
Those using groundwater for agricultural purposes have preference over
those using the same for manufacturing or industrial purposes. On its
face, the statute is very general. This lack of specificity has led to serious
criticism. Water policy expert David Aiken best summarized the failure
of Nebraska's preference statute when he claimed that "the legislation
did not establish whether domestic use included industrial water supply
by municipalities, did not specify the type of preference created, and did
not specify in what circumstances the preference would apply."23
The statute only expressed a general legislative concern, without any
specific direction. Nebraska legislators insulated themselves from any
political fallout. Senators from rural and urban Nebraska were able to
avoid confrontation over future distribution by leaving the specifics for
21. Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fisher, supra note 8, at 262.
22. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-60 (1984).
23. Aiken, Nebraska Groundwater Law and Administration, 59 Neb. L. Rev. 917, 951 (1980).
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others to determine. As the rapid increase in center-pivot irrigation and
unfavorable climatic conditions created a water crisis in the mid-1970s,
the NRDs and the courts were left with little realistic direction for making
allocative decisions.
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION
As groundwater management became a major issue in the 1970s, the
legislature passed the Ground Water [sic) Management Act of 1977.24
This act, in effect, left groundwater regulation to the local areas but
provided a few guidelines for the NRDs to follow. The legislature's
explanation for this approach was that the details were better left to the
localities: "[tihe Legislature recognizes its duty to define broad policy
goals concerning the utilization and management of groundwater and to
ensure local implementation of those goals." However, when the stated
goal is "To extend groundwater reservoir life to the greatest extent practicable, consistent with the beneficial use of groundwater and best management practices, " 2 it is clear that the implementation phase will include
a large portion of actual policymaking.
The most significant aspect of the implementation stage is that any
action will be largely at the discretion of the NRDs. Consequently, "natural resources districts are given the authority to enforce all Nebraska
groundwater legislation. However, the authority apparently is discretionary, not mandatory." 26 The NRDs are not compelled to do anything when
faced with crucial groundwater quantity problems, especially if those
issues might contain some serious political risks. The ability to avoid
issues is enhanced by the major tool (or "non-tool") for the establishment
of regulations within an area experiencing shortages of groundwater.
The Ground Water Management and Protection Act empowers the
NRDs to establish "control areas" within those parts of a district where
declining water tables are a problem. However, a control area becomes
a control area only upon the initiative of the water users within that area.
Once those in an affected part of a district ask to be made a control area,
the NRD directors conduct a hearing and make a decision as to whether
a control area should be declared. The problem is that "without some
initiation of discussion within the area sought to be regulated, the Act
has no management effect at all. . . .The Director of Water Resources
and Natural Resources Districts, charged with the responsiblities to administer the Act, is thus helpless to identify and initiate control over
problems." 27
24.
25.
26.
27.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-656 (1984).
Id. §46-656 (1984).
Supra note 8,at 251.
Supra note 9,at 81.
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State officials were rendered even more helpless in 1982 when the
legislature amended the bill to provide for "management areas" as an
alternative to control areas. The major feature of this device is that management areas can be instituted over the objections of the director of
DWR. Otherwise, an area can impose the same sorts of regulations permitted to the control area, although the amendment supposedly was to
encourage planning before the imposition of formal regulations. Whatever
the reasoning behind this change, it weakened the already weak direction
of groundwater policy by state government.
In terms of substantive solutions to groundwater problems, the 1978
act is deliberately vague. For example, the act gives to the NRDs no
clear indication of how to deal with the critical interrelationship between
ground and surface water. The act does state that "the Legislature finds
that the pumping of water for irrigation purposes from pits located within
fifty feet of the banks of any natural stream may have a direct effect on
the flow of such stream ...."2 However, this recognition of natural facts
does not necessarily provide the NRDs with guidelines to settle the status
of proprietary interests.
Klein comments on this problem: "Just what the legislature intended
to accomplish by this rather inarticulate and poorly drafted piece of legislation is unclear. The legislative history of the Ground Water Management Act indicates that one of the initial complaints against the act was
its failure to recognize that groundwater and surface flows are directly
connected to the hydrologic cycle." 29 The inevitable consequence, Klein
concluded, was that the act "encourages litigation based on proprietary
issues. "o
In summary, the pieces of legislation discussed above seem to promote
the judicialization of water policy. Have the NRDs, as the policy situs
designated by the legislature, done little more than provide the raw material for the real decisionmakers in the courts? The legislation examined
here seems to suggest a certain amount of legislative hesitation and uncertainty. The local institutions seem poorly equipped, because of these
legislative failures, to formulate clear policy directives. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the NRDs do not make the bulk of water
policy in Nebraska, nor does it mean that the courts in the state are
overwhelmed by water cases.
ARE THE COURTS INVOLVED?
These pieces of legislation seem to encourage the judicialization of
groundwater policy, but could it be that local government, in this case
28. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-636 (1984).
29. Supra note 9, at 81.
30. Id. at 84.
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the NRD, has prevented the courts from becoming the chief policy makers? Are the NRDs more than the fields from which the fodder of litigation
is harvested? If judicialization is occurring, one might expect the courts
to be swamped with cases, as various interests strive to achieve a favorable
policy statement.
Porter and Tarr point out that state supreme courts are generally assuming a more energetic role in policymaking, but that the study of these
courts is at an early stage." Studied even less are the activities of the
state trial courts where most citizens have their initial contact with the
law. At this level, one may presume, policy issues both large and small
are resolved. This obscurity of lower state courts might be understandable
if we still adhered to the concept, as described by Handberg, 2 that the
courts were an ordered hierarchy in which higher decisions were regularly
transmitted to subordinate levels. If that were the way the judiciary functioned, state trial courts might not be any more significant in public policy
than, say, a field office of the IRS. Of course, the courts do not represent
any such bureaucratic purity and, in fact, a distinctive feature of the
judiciary is that all questions originate at the bottom. Furthermore, higher
courts have claimed great latitude in picking the cases they will take up
for consideration. For most issues, the cases begin and remain at the trial
court level. Therefore, the present study into judicialization began at the
lowest level.
We identified ten counties in rural Nebraska in which water problems
had been reported in the media. We visited the courthouses to review all
district court actions involving water between 1965 and 1985. Since the
local courts have only the most rudimentary indexing system, we had to
go over several thousand pages of docket book abstracts. At the end of
our field work, we could come up with only 17 cases out of the several
thousand decided during the 20-year period that dealt in any way with
either surface or groundwater. Several of these cases reflected the ageold conflicts between neighbors over runoff and drainage problems. Eleven
of the cases were tests of the powers of the NRDs in one form or another.
With one minor exception, these latter cases were decided in favor of
the NRD.
At the Nebraska Supreme Court there was a similar lack of water cases.
There are approximately I,000 cases appealed per year to the supreme
court, the highest court in the state. During the period of 1965-1985 there
were only 52 water-related cases. Less than three cases a year on average
suggests that water cases do not dominate the court's agenda. Academics
31. M. Porter & G. Tarr, State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System 5 (1982).
32. Handberg, Pushing the String on Policy Implementation: Using the Judiciary and Other Quaint
Novelties, 13 Pol'y Stud. J. 831 (1985).
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are fond of saying that the courts are busy making water policy, but a
look at the supreme court's docket does not support this claim.
The first and most obvious conclusion from this research is that the
judicialization of water policy is grossly overstated. The courts are not
active centers of debate among contending social forces over the distribution and management of water resources. Conflict resolution undoubtedly takes place through other channels, primarily the DWR and NRDs.
The district courts have placed considerable reliance on the NRDs, while
the supreme court apparently defers to the expertise of the director of
DWR. In both cases, the courts are tools for the administrative units and
are not the important arbiters of water disputes.
CONCLUSION
If it is true that the Nebraska legislators are behaving in the same way
as those in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona and Utah, as
described by Ingram," and Smith,34 the question remains: who is actually
making water policy? Beneath all the concern about the judicialization
of water policy, we find that it is not the courts who are making policy.
Rather, it is the legislatively empowered DWR and NRDs. These two
sub-arenas, the technical and the democratic, have not necessarily led to
a more open policy process for water in Nebraska. While the courts may
not be the significant actors, the alternatives we have identified here are
equally insulated from direct popular control.
The NRDs have been most disappointing as political entities. They
seem to fit in well with the localistic Nebraska political culture, but it is
surely true that one can become entangled in the grass roots. In the 17
years of operation, the NRDs have not been bastions of democratic participation. Put another way, they have not been perceived as general
purpose units of government which reflect the political aspirations of a
wide diversity of interests. In the Omaha and Lincoln areas until 1988,
there was such gross malapportionment in voting for district directors
that, in some cases, a farmer's vote was worth ten times the vote of a
city person.
The situation would have been even more deplorable if in fact the city
person was at all interested in the work of the NRDs. Despite their broad
powers, NRDs have generated little excitement among the urban public.
They still retain many of the political characteristics of the traditional,
rural special district. Thus, only those citizens most directly concerned
with irrigation have been inspired to get involved. Especially in rural
33. Supra note 4, at 743.
34. Supra note 5, at 641.
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areas, NRDs tend to be closed clubs of irrigators, and most of the members
see that it is in their interest to avoid any controversy which might lead
to a curtailment of their power, especially by urban legislators who occasionally voice their misgivings about how the cities are being shortchanged in water development projects.
The NRDs, it must be noted, have adjusted to new political pressures
and are developing some sophistication in protecting their power. In 1986
after some cities threatened to withdraw from the districts because of a
feeling that tax dollars went disproportionately to rural projects, and after
some state senators voiced their concern about district malapportionment,
the NRDs promoted a compromise. A 1987 act required that all districts
set up a system whereby the largest sub-district from which directors are
elected will not have more than three times the number of voters of the
smallest sub-district. In the area of groundwater quality, the NRDs also
responded to a perceived threat of greater statewide control by instituting
their own quality control plans. It is clear that the districts see the political
forces in the state, and not the courts, as the greatest threat to their best
interests and to their central role in water policymaking.
Water will remain a critical resource in the nation and is especially
important in the western states. In the case of Nebraska, the legislature
has failed to fully address the crucial issues of water management. Water
legislation that claims to resolve the issues is more illusory than substantive. For the study of public policy, Nebraska's statutes are only the
beginning, and not the end. A true picture of water policy making requires
an investigation of all the policy actors. With respect to other states, the
message from the Nebraska case is clear: Even though it appears that the
state legislature has acted decisively on water issues, a thorough examination of all policy actors is necessary to identify the real center of
political gravity.

